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The inducement rule “premises liability on purposeful culpable expression and 
conduct.”1 It prohibits “deliberately urging consumers to make illicit use of the 
product or showing them how it could be done.”2
I.  INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Is it a prudent business judgment to purchase a web site company for $1.65 billion 
that streams amateur video clips and allows anyone to upload copyrighted videos?3  That 
sounds like a classroom hypothetical illustrating potential copyright infringement liability 
and bad business judgment. 
¶2 It appears the contemporary proliferation of social networking web sites4 and the 
millions who use YouTube5 convinced Google to acquire YouTube for that extravagant 
price.  Months later, Viacom sued YouTube for copyright infringement seeking 
injunctive relief and $1 billion in damages6 for showing 150,000 of its copyrighted clips 
illegally 1.5 billion times.7  The Viacom complaint alleges that “YouTube’s brazen 
disregard of the intellectual property laws fundamentally threatens not just Plaintiffs, but 
 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Plymouth State University; Duke University (J.D.), Boston 
College (M.B.A.), Cornell University (B.S.). 
** Gregory H. Adamian Professor of Law, Bentley College; Executive Director of the Bentley Global 
Cyberlaw Center, New England School of Law (J.D.), Bentley College (M.S.T.), Boston College (B.S.). 
1 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2005). 
2 Linda Greenhouse & Lorne Manly, Justices Reinstate Suits on Internet File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, June 
28, 2005, at A1. 
3 Viacom and YouTube: War Is Declared, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2007, at 70. 
4 Social networking web sites include well-known sites such as Facebook and MySpace, but also many 
others.  For a list of numerous social networking web sites, see Wikipedia, List of Social Networking 
Websites, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_social_networking_websites (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).   
5 See Google’s YouTube Unit Dominates Online Video Business, COMPUTERWORLD, July 17, 2007, 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName= 
networking_and_internet&articleId=9027227&taxonomyId=16 (reporting that Americans recently viewed 
more than eight billion online videos in a single month, 1.7 billion of which were viewed on YouTube).   
6 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
No. 07-CV-2103 2007 WL 775611, ¶ 10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007).   
7 Id. ¶ 3.  See also Viacom, Viacom Files Federal Copyright Infringement Claim Against YouTube and 
Google, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.viacom.com/NEWS/NewsText.aspx?RID=1009865.  A separate class 
action suit has also been filed against YouTube by The Football Association Premier League and Bourne 
Co., which suit has recently been joined by the heavyweight National Music Publishers’ Association.  See 
Ethan Smith & Kevin J. Delaney, Music Publishers to Join YouTube Copyright Suit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 
2007, at A2; see also Class Action Complaint, Football Ass’n Premier League v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-
CV-3582 WL 1992627 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 2007).  
 1
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 7  
 
the economic underpinnings of one of the most important sectors of the United States 
economy.”8  If Viacom is successful, could this be the end of social networking sites and 
what appears to be a cultural shift in the digital media? 
¶3 The recent phenomenon of social networking has vast social and political 
consequences as presidential candidates and others have adopted them to project their 
electronic messages.9  Millions of students have pages on MySpace and other social 
networking sites that display intimate personal information,10 which is often accompanied 
by copyrighted content that has been uploaded without the owner’s consent.  The 
potential copyright violations of social networking sites creating this cyber phenomenon 
are the basis of this paper. 
¶4 Part II discusses the context of the internet copyright issues at stake and presents 
the overarching policy goals that guide courts and legislators alike in formulating 
copyright policy.  Part III reviews the common law history of secondary copyright 
infringement liability, which permits a copyright owner to sue a web site that enables a 
direct infringer to use its site to copy or upload copyrighted content without the owner’s 
permission.  Part IV analyzes 17 U.S.C. § 512, the “safe harbor” of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and its application to social networking sites.  This 
statute is the principal defense in the Viacom v. YouTube case.11  Because one can expect 
the uploading of copyrighted video clips without the owner’s consent to be common 
practice on social networking sites, the application of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions 
to secondary copyright infringement is the salient issue to be resolved.  To the extent that 
social networking sites are ineligible for DMCA safe harbor protection, their liability will 
be determined under traditional copyright doctrines.  Part V therefore explains the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster that 
established the new inducement rule’s application to social networking sites.12  Part V 
also discusses whether social networking sites are likely to escape liability in the absence 
of safe harbor protection under the Grokster standard.  This analysis has special 
significance because the DMCA was adopted by Congress in 1998, long before the 
existence of social networking sites.13  Part VI concludes by proposing an outcome to the 
YouTube case that would largely allow social networking sites to remain within the safe 
harbor of the DMCA. 
 
8 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶ 2. 
9 Campaigning on the Internet: Of Slips and Video Clips, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2007, at 80. 
10 MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).  See Associated Press, District to 
Monitor Students’ MySpace Pages, MSNBC, May 23, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12937962/ 
(“[MySpace] allows its nearly 80 million users to post pictures and personal information . . . .”).   
11 See Defendant’s Answer and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-
CV-02103 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2007). 
12 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005).   
13 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[The DMCA] was not passed 
with Napster-type services in mind . . . .”).
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II.  COPYRIGHT ON THE INTERNET 
A.  The Nature of the Issue 
¶5 In discussing copyright liability in the context of social networking sites, it is easy 
to fixate on content that has been created by large motion picture studios, widely 
published authors, or well-known songwriters.  Perhaps this is so because those who have 
been the most vocal in expressing concern over copyrighted content on the internet have 
included or represented these types of companies or individuals.  Yet because copyright 
subsists from the moment of a work’s creation, with no additional steps required by the 
author to secure a copyright in that work,14 nearly all recently-created content on the 
internet is copyrighted, including pedestrian user-created content.  This means that a short 
home video of a birthday party given in honor of the family pet or a two-minute video 
demonstration of “How to Tear a Phone Book in Half”15 are both entitled to the 
protections of federal copyright law. 
¶6 Because a growing number of social networking sites allow users to post photos, 
videos, and other digital files for public viewing, inevitably resulting in their copying and 
distribution, copyright issues within social networking sites are pervasive.  Prominent 
among these sites with respect to video sharing is YouTube, where approximately 100 
million videos are watched every day.16  Users wishing to upload videos must expressly 
grant to YouTube “a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and 
transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and 
perform” the videos.17   Copyright infringement of purely user-created videos that do not 
contain copyrighted works thus becomes a non-issue.     
¶7 Copyright concerns arise not when users upload their own videos, but when a user 
uploads a third party’s video or a video that contains within it content belonging to a third 
party.  This would include blatant copyright violations such as uploading the full-length 
film “Schindler’s List,” but may also include less obvious acts of infringement, such as 
posting a five-minute video of a fifth-grader’s dance recital that is performed to 
copyrighted music.   It is possible, of course, that even non-permissive uses of 18
 
14 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its 
creation . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 104 (2006) (In many cases, United States copyright law protects works fixed 
outside the United States or created by those who are not United States nationals.).  Note that works of the 
United States government, whether or not online, are not entitled to copyright protection.  17 U.S.C. § 105 
(2006).    
15 See YouTube, How to Tear a Phone Book in Half, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2oJ4L9cyyrI 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2007).   
16 YouTube Hits 100m Videos Per Day, BBC NEWS, July 17, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/5186618.stm.  Although much of this article draws on the 
circumstances surrounding the Viacom v. YouTube dispute, the issues are by no means unique to YouTube.  
Universal Music Group is maintaining a similar copyright infringement suit against MySpace for 
“encouraging and facilitating” the illegal sharing by MySpace users of its videos and songs.  See Complaint 
for Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, for Inducement of Copyright Infringement, 
and for Violations of California Business and Professions Code §17200, UMG Records, Inc. v. MySpace, 
Inc., No. CV-06-07361, 2006 WL 3466446 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006).  Other suits are sure to follow.   
17 YouTube, Terms of Use, ¶ 6(C), http://youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). 
18 See Cynthia Blake Sanders & Sara L. Alpert, Background Music in Sports Sampling, Copyright Law 
and the Infringing Gymnast, 40 MD. B.J. 4, 10 (2007) (noting that such use of copyrighted music is likely 
infringing the exclusive right to public performance).  
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copyrighted works may be legal under the fair use doctrine.19  However, if fair use does 
not apply and permission has not been granted, a person uploading copies of a work to 
the internet with the intent that they be copied, distributed, and viewed by others commits 
copyright infringement.   
¶8 Locating end-users who infringe copyrighted works can be difficult and expensive, 
however,20 so copyright holders have sought to aggregate their legal claims by bringing 
suit against the entities which made the copyright violations possible — in this case, 
YouTube — under secondary copyright liability theories.21  The road to such secondary 
liability for facilitating digital content exchange was paved by suits against music file-
sharing companies Napster,  Aimster,  and Grokster,22 23 24 all of which resulted in decisions 
favorable to the imposition of secondary copyright liability.    Is YouTube destined to go 
the way of Napster, being forced to radically alter its business model until it is nothing 
but a shadow of its former self?25  Should it be?  What is YouTube’s culpability for the 
copyright violations that are occurring on its web site?     
B.  Copyright: A Balancing of Interests 
¶9 As is frequently the case with novel legal issues, the answers to new questions can 
be inspired by considering existing analogous scenarios, then determining which of those 
scenarios most closely animates the current fact pattern.   
¶10 Copyright infringement is in the nature of a tort,26 so it is worth considering torts 
that are enabled by the products or services of third parties.  No one suggests that 
 
19 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 321-22 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (The fair use doctrine “limits the exclusive rights of a copyright holder by permitting 
others to make limited use of portions of the copyrighted work, for appropriate purposes, free of liability 
for copyright infringement.”); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (“The [fair use] 
doctrine. . . . ‘permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would 
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” (quoting Iowa State Research Found., Inc. v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980))).  
20 See Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An 
Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 397 (2003).  
21 The Supreme Court seems to agree with copyright holders that in some cases, suing a direct infringer 
is “impractical.”  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005) 
(“When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce 
rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to 
go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or 
vicarious infringement.”); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003)  
(“Recognizing the impracticability or futility of a copyright owner’s suing a multitude of individual 
infringers . . . the law allows a copyright holder to sue a contributor to infringement instead . . . .”).
22 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  See generally Daniel D. Hill, 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.: A Victory in the War To Sound the Digital Death Knell for Peer-To-
Peer Online File Sharing, 12 WIDENER L.J. 161 (2003). 
23 Aimster, 334 F.3d 643.
24 Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.   
25 Some think that it will.  See, e.g., Eric Benderoff, Billion-Dollar Battle: Viacom vs. YouTube, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 14, 2007, at C1 (“[Video sharing] ‘will get reined in like file sharing, where the major sites 
were closed down.’” (quoting Brian Heidelberger, Partner, Winston & Strawn LLP)); Mark Cuban: Only a 
‘Moron’ Would Buy YouTube, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 30, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,216714,00.html (quoting Silicon Valley billionaire Mark Cuban as 
stating that YouTube will be “sued into oblivion”).   
26 Sverker K. Högberg, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 914 n.33 (2006).
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manufacturers of baseball bats should be held liable for battery committed by users of the 
bats.27  Similarly, the authors could not find a reported case holding camera 
manufacturers (whether of digital or analog cameras) liable for the derivative works 
created when camera owners take pictures of underlying copyrighted works.28  Nor is 
there a widespread movement seeking to hold typewriter or computer manufacturers 
liable for the copyright infringement of typewriter or computer owners, though the 
question has been posed.29  Nor have companies that manufacture photocopying 
machines been held liable for copyright infringement by the machine’s owners.    30
¶11 Each of these products could be used to break the law, yet society, via the 
legislative and judicial processes, has largely chosen not to impose liability on the 
manufacturers of these products.  Why?  Perhaps the most obvious answer is that these 
products can be used lawfully in a variety of ways that are considered valuable.  Imagine 
banning the game of baseball because of the number of crimes committed each year using 
bats,31 or forbidding the manufacture of cameras or photocopy machines because they 
could be used to commit copyright infringement.    32
¶12 Clearly, there is a balancing of interests occurring in the decision of whether and 
when to impose copyright liability, whether direct or secondary.  “In enacting a copyright 
law Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation 
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and second, how much will the 
monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?”   Copyright rewards owners and thus 33
 
27 See, e.g., Bunch v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 123 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1302 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“A 
manufacturer is liable only if the product was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”).  
28 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429, 462 (C.D. Cal. 1979) 
(“Vicarious liability has not been extended so far [as to bring camera manufacturers within its reach].”), 
rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).    
29 See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 20, at 396; see also David Nimmer, On the Sony Side of the 
Street, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 205, 218 (2004) (“‘[A]ny rule that would say that . . . manufacturers [of personal 
computers] should be held liable simply because they can and, in fact, are used for infringing purposes is a 
rule that we as a society really can’t live with. It’s a rule that pushes the copyright monopoly too far into 
the area of technology regulation….’” (quoting Fred von Lohmann, Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation)).  
30 See CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A] copy machine owner 
who makes the machine available to the public to use for copying is not, without more, strictly liable [for 
copyright infringement].”).  Judge Posner, analogizing to even more distantly related wrongs, noted: “A 
retailer of slinky dresses is not guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution even if he knows that some of his 
customers are prostitutes--he may even know which ones are.” In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 
643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003).  See also Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 853 (2005) (noting that courts do not consider gun manufacturers, railroads, or 
drug companies intentional tortfeasors even though these companies know with substantial certainty that 
injury or death will result from their products or services); Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online 
Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 277 (2006) (“[T]he upstream makers of photocopying machines 
and similar technologies are insulated from contributory liability for the act of producing and distributing 
the technologies.”).
31 See Craig Perkins, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: National Crime Victimization Survey, 
1993-2001, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Sept. 2003, at 2, available at 
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wuvc01.pdf (reporting that between 1993 and 2001, approximately 
356,000 crimes were committed with blunt objects “such as a brick, bat, or bottle”). 
32 Libraries are specifically protected from secondary copyright liability for copies made by library 
patrons at a library photocopy machine, provided that the copying is “unsupervised” and that the library 
post a notice “that the making of a copy may be subject to the copyright law.”  17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) 
(2006). 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 7 (1909). 
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stimulates them to create works that contribute to the public good.  Nevertheless, “[t]he 
copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.”34  “[T]he ultimate aim [of copyright law] is . . . to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.”35  It is therefore unsurprising that, when balancing 
the public good created by cameras, computers, and photocopying machines against the 
potential copyright infringement that is enabled by their manufacture, society has come to 
tolerate some increased likelihood of copyright violations in exchange for the significant 
benefits derived from these products. 
¶13 Cameras, photocopiers, and computers have existed for decades or longer, and 
recognizing their value is a comparatively simple matter.  With new technologies, it is not 
always readily apparent to what extent those technologies are, or will be, beneficial.36  
Caution must therefore be exercised when legislating or deciding that a certain piece of 
new technology imposes too great a cost to copyright holders.  What would society be 
like if the four dissenting justices in Sony37 had carried the day and Sony was forced to 
alter or discontinue its product?  Nor is it clear that the pro-copyright resolution of 
Napster38 and its progeny have led to an optimal state of affairs.  Theft of musical works 
on the internet is still rampant39 and public respect and support for copyright laws may be 
waning.40  More importantly, five years after Napster, there is still no alternative web site 
where the public may legally (and by payment of appropriate fees) obtain as wide a 
variety of music with the ease and efficiency that had been enabled by Napster.    41
 
34 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).   
35 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979); see also 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary 
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of 
authors.”).
36 See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young Technologies: A Comment on Sony, 
Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 877, 889-90 (2005) (arguing that 
courts are likely to both underestimate the social benefits of new technologies and overestimate their costs); 
Yen, supra note 30, at 829 (“[S]ociety rarely appreciates the full benefits of new technologies immediately 
upon their invention.”); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2003). 
(“The [Sony] Court’s action in striking the cost-benefit tradeoff in favor of Sony came to seem prescient 
when it later turned out that the principal use of video recorders was to allow people to watch at-home 
movies that they bought or rented rather than to tape television programs. (In 1984, when Sony was 
decided, the industry was unsure how great the demand would be for prerecorded tapes compared to time 
shifting . . . .)”).      
37 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
38 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).   
39 See, e.g., YouTube Signs Licensing Deal with British Composers’ Group, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 
30, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/30/business/youtube.php (“[M]ajor media companies say 
piracy of copyrighted works is rampant.”); The Role of Technology in Reducing Illegal Filesharing: A 
University Perspective: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 110th Cong. 10-11 (2007) 
(statement of Rep. Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking Member, Comm. on Sci. & Tech.), available at 
http://gop.science.house.gov/hearings/full07/June%205/Hall.pdf (“[I]llegal file-sharing of music, movies, 
software, and other content is easier than ever. . . .  This rampant disregard for copyright law needs to 
end.”); Bryan H. Choi, The Grokster Dead-End, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 410 (2006) (“[I]llegal file-
sharing has . . . continued at ever-increasing rates. . . .”); Zittrain, supra note 30, at 286 (“[U]nauthorized 
file sharing continued unabated, and indeed grew [after Napster]. . . .”). 
40 See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 679 (2005) 
(“Since the MP3.com and Napster battles, the public has become increasingly aware of copyright issues, 
and a growing portion has viewed copyright law with disdain.”).  
41 See, e.g., Anne Broache, Politicos Warn Schools for Campus Piracy, USATODAY.COM, June 6, 2006, 
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¶14 The copyright conundrum thus remains and, in the online context, begs for a 
rebalancing.  On the one hand, the internet has been described as a “giant photocopier,”42 
and its ability to make perfect copies has been cited as a reason why the internet 
“threatens copyright holders as never before.”43  On the other hand, this ability to make 
perfect copies cheaply, easily, and without respect to distance or geography is the source 
of tremendous potential and provides the foundations for services that may in the future 
confer tremendous public benefits.   
III.  SECONDARY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY 
A.  Secondary Copyright Liability — Two Theories 
¶15  There are two related but distinct theories by which one entity can be held 
secondarily liable for copyright infringement, or liable for the copyright infringement of 
another: contributory copyright infringement and vicarious copyright infringement.  
Although the lines of distinction between contributory and vicarious infringement are not 
clearly drawn,44 contributory infringement requires an intent to induce another to commit 
infringement,45 while vicarious infringement occurs when one party profits from the 
infringing activities of another while failing to exercise a right to stop the infringing 
activity.   The Copyright Act does not reference either of these common law theories of 46
 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/cnet/2007-06-06-politicos-schools-copyright-
sharing_N.htm (“‘So long as the right thing remains more daunting, awkward and unsatisfying than the 
wrong thing [i.e., illegal downloading], too many people will do the wrong thing.’” (quoting Greg Jackson, 
Chief Information Officer, University of Chicago)); see also Choi, supra note 39, at 404-05 (suggesting 
that there is a trade-off between immunity from secondary copyright liability and efficient network 
architecture).  “[N]o solution today offers the incredible combination of ease, speed, reliability, and 
scalability that Napster was able to achieve.” Id. at 410.   
42 Michael J. Madison, The Narratives of Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from Casablanca), 27 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 249, 251 (2004) (“Cyberspace has been characterized as a giant photocopier….”); Paul 
Ganley, Digital Copyright and the New Creative Dynamics, 12 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 282, 284 (2004) 
(“A new layer of protection is needed: technical fences to curtail the ceaseless operation of the giant 
networked photocopier.”).  An internet service provider whose services did not involve creating or 
controlling the content of user-posted messages was held to be similar to the owner of a copy machine who 
lets the public make copies with it.  Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 
F.Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  
43 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005). 
44 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429, 435 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
45 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘One who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another may be 
liable as a contributory copyright infringer.’” (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971))); Online Policy Group v. Diebold Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 
1200 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“The party alleging contributory infringement must show ‘(1) direct infringement 
by a primary infringer, (2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution to the 
infringement.’” (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th 
Cir.2004));  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the 
contribution to infringement must be material). 
46 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (“One. . . infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while 
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it. . . .”); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 492, 500 (E.D. 
Pa. 2006), aff’d, Parker v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1989660, at *4 (3d Cir. July 10, 2007) (“There are two 
elements to a successful claim of vicarious copyright infringement: (1) the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing conduct and (2) an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
materials.”) (internal quotations omitted); Diebold, 337 F.Supp.2d at 1200 (“A defendant may be liable 
under a vicarious liability theory if the plaintiff demonstrates ‘(1) direct infringement by a primary party, 
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secondary liability.47  Nevertheless, secondary liability “is imposed in virtually all areas 
of the law”48 and, more to the point, has long been a fixture in copyright law 
jurisprudence.      49
B.  Contributory Infringement Liability 
¶16 In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., the seminal 
case on contributory infringement liability, the court ruled that a person “who, with 
knowledge of the [direct] infringement activity, induces, causes or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another, [he] may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ 
infringer.”50   The common law of torts traditionally recognized contributory liability 
where a person or business establishment directly contributes to another’s wrongful 
conduct.51  A finding of knowledge of the direct copyright infringement and a material 
contribution by the secondary infringer are both necessary to establish contributory 
infringement liability.52  Secondary infringement may take the form of inducing the direct 
infringers to violate copyright laws.53  This can be evidenced by a business model 
designed to attract direct infringers or continuing to allow infringement when notified of 
the wrongful conduct.  54
¶17 Contributory infringement liability is especially relevant to social networking sites, 
which host millions of user-posted files that may directly infringe a copyright.  Web sites 
may potentially receive daily notifications by countless numbers of copyright owners 
alleging their works are being infringed.   Such notifications could establish 55
 
(2) a direct financial benefit to the defendant, and the right and ability to supervise the infringers.’” 
(quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir.2004))).   
47 Lichtman & Landes, supra note 20, at 396 (“Unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act of 1976 does 
not explicitly recognize the possibility of indirect liability.”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (“The absence of such express language [creating secondary 
liability] in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for [secondary] copyright 
infringements. . . .”).  
48 Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. 
49 Högberg, supra note 26, at 909 (“[S]econdary liability doctrines are well established in copyright 
law….”); see also Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (2d Cir. 
1971) (“[I]t has long been held that one may be liable for copyright infringement even though he has not 
himself performed the protected composition.”); Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412, 414 (2d Cir. 
1916) (“Why all who unite in an infringement are not, under the statute, liable for damages sustained by 
plaintiff, we are unable to see. . . . [A]s all united in infringing, all are responsible for the damages resulting 
from infringement.”).  
50 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
51 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Contributory infringement 
originates in tort law and stems from the notion that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement 
should be held accountable.”).  
52 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. 
53 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
54 Id. at 925-26 (“The point [of StreamCast’s business model], of course, would be to attract users of a 
mind to infringe….”).
55 Scott Carlson, New Company Besieges Colleges with Notices About Copyright Violations, CHRONICLE 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 30, 2001, at A29, available at 
http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i14/14a02901.htm (The number of takedown notices sent per day has likely 
increased substantially since the DMCA took effect.  As far back as 2001, Cornell University was reported 
to have received “up to 25 requests in the past two months, up from 15 or so in each of the previous years,” 
while “the University of Maryland at College Park, which never got more than 20 notices a year in the past, 
has received more than 100 since the semester’s start. . . .”);  See WIPO, Batur Oktay & Greg Wrenn, A 
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“knowledge” on the part of the web site, thereby subjecting it to potential contributory 
infringement liability.  They risk potential secondary copyright liability based on the 
theory of being facilitators of the direct infringement.  56
C.  Vicarious Infringement Liability 
¶18 Vicarious infringement has its origin in the common law,57 found in the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.58  It is established on the theory that the defendant had the right and 
ability to supervise the direct infringement and had a direct financial interest in the 
infringed copyrighted work.   “59 To escape imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved 
right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent.  Turning a blind eye to detectable 
acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability.”   60 Direct financial 
interest includes both present interest as well as a “future hope to monetize.”  61
¶19   The early so-called “dance hall” cases placed vicarious copyright infringement 
liability on establishments where music was performed by an infringing band or orchestra 
even though the dance hall proprietor was not involved in the choice of infringing music 
played by the band but acquired a financial benefit from the performance.62   In one of 
these cases, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., the court ruled that knowledge 
of the infringement is not necessary when a reasonable person should have known of its 
occurrence.  63
¶20 An ongoing relationship with a direct infringer makes it more likely that a party 
will be held liable for secondary copyright infringement.   In order to post a video on 64
 
Look Back at the Notice-Takedown Provisions of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act One Year After 
Enactment, Dec. 1, 1999, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/osp/doc/osp_lia2.doc (“Adobe’s investigators send 40-
90 take down notices per day.”); Seth Sutel, Viacom Asks YouTube to Remove Over 100,000 Unauthorized 
Video Clips, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-02-02-viacom-
youtube_x.htm (In early 2007 Viacom asked YouTube to take down more than 100,000 allegedly 
unauthorized clips); Miles Skorpen, RIAA Targets Swarthmore, THE DAILY GAZETTE (Swarthmore 
College, Swarthmore, PA), Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.sccs.swarthmore.edu/org/daily/2007/08/31/riaa-
targets-swarthmore/ (In August 2007, it was reported that Swarthmore College received “thousand [sic] of 
takedown notices… from companies across the world.”). 
56 See Högberg, supra note 26, at 909. 
57 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. 
58 See J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Va. 1988) (“Under [the doctrine of] 
respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s tortious acts committed within the 
scope of employment.”).  
59 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (“One… infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while 
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it….”).
60 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). 
61  § 12.04[A][1] (2005); see also  4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 
2007 WL 1113800, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 13, 2007); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828, 857 
(C.D. Cal. 2006).
62 See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); see also Dreamland Ball 
Room v. Shapiro Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929). 
63 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (“When the right and 
ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
materials — even in the absence of actual knowledge . . . the purposes of copyright law may be best 
effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.”); see In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law 
(where indeed it may be enough that the defendant should have known of the direct infringement. . . .)”).
64 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429, 437 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (noting that 
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YouTube, a user must sign up (and thereby agree to the YouTube terms of service),65 
which makes it more likely that YouTube will have an ongoing relationship with those 
who have uploaded content.  Generally speaking, providers of services (including social 
networking sites) are more likely to have ongoing relationships with their customers than 
are vendors of products, such as a VCR.  66
¶21 This theory of secondary copyright liability should be especially worrisome to 
social networking sites.  A financial interest is surely evident by the vast number of 
subscribers and advertising patrons.  A social networking site, without knowledge of the 
direct copyright infringers, could be held liable based on a common law duty to supervise 
in a careful manner.  A reasonable standard of supervision would work in favor of 
copyright holders because the vast number of posted videos should suggest that 
reasonable supervision would create awareness on the part of the web site of the direct 
infringement. 
D.  Inducement Rule: Grokster 
¶22 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,67 the defendant, Grokster, 
distributed free software allowing peer-to-peer users to share files directly with each 
other without going through a central server.  Most of the users shared copyrighted music 
and video files without the permission of the copyright owners.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. alleged that Grokster “knowingly and intentionally distributed their software 
to enable users to infringe copyrighted works in violation of the Copyright Act.”68  
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, framed the issue by stating: “The question is 
under what circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and 
unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using the 
product.”  69
¶23 This question will continue to be relevant to copyright infringement claims based 
on secondary contributory infringement brought against social networking sites.  
Consider that YouTube has created a network where both lawful and unlawful use is 
possible.  The Grokster Court applied the rule on inducement of infringement by stating: 
[E]vidence of active steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringement such as 
advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, 
show an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing 
that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability 
 
in cases where there is an ongoing relationship, the alleged secondary infringer is in a position to control 
the use of the copyrighted works by the primary infringer). 
65 YouTube, Help Center: Do I Have to Sign Up to Upload Videos?, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=55740&topic=10525 (“Since videos are 
attached to your profile, you must sign up as a member to upload videos.”). 
66 See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648 (“[T]he provider of a service, unlike the seller of a product, has a 
continuing relation with its customers.”).
67 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 (2005). 
68 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 920-21; see also Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828, 727 n.11 (C.D. 
Cal. 2006) (“Google’s activities do not meet the ‘inducement’ test explained in Grokster because Google 
has not promoted the use of its search engine specifically to infringe copyrights . . . However, the Supreme 
Court in Grokster did not suggest that a court must find inducement in order to impose contributory 
liability under common law principles.”). 
69 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 918-19. 
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when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful 
use.70
¶24 In a claim against a social networking site, the plaintiff during discovery would 
question the nature of the business plan, its marketing strategy, and any e-mails or other 
correspondence that might reveal the company’s intent to “encourage direct 
infringement.”  The Grokster Court was careful to point out that: 
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not 
be enough . . . to subject a distributor to liability.  Nor would ordinary acts 
incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or 
product up-dates support liability in themselves.  The inducement rule, instead, 
premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does 
nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a 
lawful purpose.71
¶25 That rule as expressed by the Supreme Court is not especially helpful because if a 
copyright owner notified the website of an alleged infringement, one could argue that the 
social networking site by continuing to post the infringing content is engaging in 
“purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.”  What is meant by “purposeful, culpable 
expression and conduct” will continue to perplex counsel advising a network receiving 
alleged copyright violations. 
¶26 For example, consider the famously popular iPod, and in particular the 80 gigabyte 
version which can hold up to 20,000 songs.72  The unit is available on Apple, Inc.’s web 
site for $349.   However, at $0.99 per song,73 74 it would cost nearly $20,000 to fill the 
iPod to capacity, which is more than fifty times the cost of the iPod itself.  Given that 
iPods have enjoyed wide popularity among high school and college students (who may 
be reluctant or unable to spend $20,000 on music) one might infer that Apple’s business 
strategy and profits are based on the assumption or even intent that purchasers will use its 
product to store and play unauthorized copies of music.75  Does that proposed business 
strategy constitute “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct?”  Assume for the 
moment that iPod users do in fact illegally copy large amounts of copyrighted material to 
and from their iPods.  If this is the case, should Apple be any less condemned than 
YouTube, simply because it is more difficult to identify the direct infringement offline 
than online? 
 
70 Id. at 936. 
71 Id. at 937. 
72 Apple Inc., http://www.apple.com/ipod/ipod.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
73 The Apple Store, http://store.apple.com/1-800-MY-APPLE/WebObjects/AppleStore?family=iPod 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
74 Apple iTunes Store, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/music.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
75 See generally Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006, 
http://slate.com/id/2152264 (acknowledging Apple’s deft maneuvering through the copyright labyrinth, at 
the same time that “its iPods make swapping music all the more part of being American”). 
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IV.  THE “SAFE HARBOR” OF SECTION 512 OF THE DMCA 
¶27 In enacting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Congress sought to 
protect the rights of copyright holders while allowing internet service providers to operate 
and innovate without the fear of unlimited liability.76  Thus, a series of safe harbors was 
established so that, by complying with the requirements of the DMCA, companies 
providing certain internet-based services could be assured that they would not have to 
pay damages for copyright infringement.  The safe harbors protect “service providers” 
who are engaged in various online activities, including the provision of “transitory digital 
network communications,” “system caching,” and “information location tools,” or who 
control or operate a system or network where material is stored “at the direction of a 
user.”77  Moreover, the legislative history of this section makes clear that “qualifying 
service providers” will be relieved of liability not only for vicarious and contributory 
infringement, but also for direct copyright infringement.  78
¶28 The subsection of the DMCA that most directly applies to social networking sites is 
§ 512(c), which creates a safe harbor from liability for service providers for “information 
residing on [a service provider’s] systems or networks at the direction of users,” provided 
certain conditions are met.79  These conditions address (1) the service provider’s 
knowledge of the infringing material, (2) the financial benefit to the service provider that 
is derived from the infringing material, (3) the service provider’s response in removing 
infringing material when notified thereof,80 (4) the service provider’s implementation of a 
policy whereby users who repeatedly engage in copyright infringement may have their 
account access disabled, and (5) the implementation of “standard technical measures” 
that allow copyright owners to identify copyrighted works.81  Conditions (4) and (5) have 
been described by courts as “threshold conditions.”82  In addition, an entity must as a 
threshold matter qualify as a “service provider.”  83
A.  Threshold Requirements of Section 512 Safe Harbor Protection 
¶29 As a threshold matter, an entity seeking to take refuge in any of the § 512 safe 
harbors must meet the threshold conditions of qualifying as a service provider, 
 
76 See Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 99, 99-100 (2005-2006); see also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“Congress hoped to provide ‘greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for 
infringements that may occur in the course of their activities.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 
(1998))). 
77 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
78 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 40 (1998) (“The limitations in subsections (a) through (d) [of § 512] protect 
qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory 
infringement.”); Id. at 43 (“Subsection (c) limits the liability of qualifying service providers for claims of 
direct, vicarious and contributory infringement . . . .”); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As to direct infringement, liability is ruled out [under the DMCA] 
for passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated by another.”).
79 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006). 
80 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006). 
81 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006). 
82 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
83 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
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reasonably implementing a termination policy, and accommodating standard technical 
measures. 
1. Are Social Networking Sites “Service Providers”? 
¶30 Only those entities that qualify as “service providers” are entitled to the benefit of 
the § 512 safe harbors.   84 Thus, whether YouTube is considered a service provider is a 
critical threshold matter.  Section 512 provides two different definitions for the term 
“service provider.” The first definition applies to § 512(a), addressing “transitory digital 
network communications,” and defines a “service provider” as “an entity offering the 
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, 
between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without 
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”85  The hosting of a web 
site does not fall within this definition, whereas providing connectivity for such a web 
site does fall within the definition.   The second definition is broader,86 87 and includes all 
entities captured by the first definition, plus “provider[s] of online services or network 
access, or the operator of facilities therefore.”  88
¶31 Fortunately, this oblique statutory language has been clarified somewhat by the 
legislative history and by case law, which have made it clear that the definition of 
“service provider” is very broad.89  The Senate Report accompanying the DMCA noted 
that “services such as providing Internet access, e-mail, chat room and web page hosting 
services” were specifically contemplated by the legislature as being covered by the 
broader definition of “service provider.”   90 Courts have consistently applied a broad 
definition to the term “service provider” to bring within the definition a wide range of 
entities, including, Aimster,  eBay,  and Amazon.91 92 93  Even Napster may have fallen 
within the purview of § 512.  94
 
84 Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (“At the outset, a party seeking safe harbor must, in fact, be a ‘service 
provider’ as that term is defined under the DMCA.”).  Entities not qualifying under a § 512 safe harbor may 
still avoid liability, but must do so under the traditional copyright scheme (for example, by successfully 
asserting fair use). 17 U.S.C. § 512(l) (“The failure of a service provider’s conduct to qualify for limitation 
of liability under this section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service 
provider that the service provider’s conduct is not infringing under this title or any other defense.”).  
85 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
86 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 54 (1998) (“For example, hosting a World Wide Web site does not fall within 
the subsection (j)(1)(A) definition; providing connectivity for a world wide web site does fall within that 
definition.”).
87 See id.  (“This definition [contained in § 512(k)(1)(B)] is broader than the [definition contained in § 
512(k)(1)(A)] . . . .”).
88 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2006). 
89 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
DMCA defines “service provider” broadly).
90 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 54 (noting that these activities are covered under the [broader] § 
512(k)(1)(B) definition).
91 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he definition of Internet 
service provider [contained in § 512(k)(1)(B)] is broad . . . and Aimster fits it.”).
92 Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“eBay clearly meets the 
DMCA’s broad definition of online ‘service provider.’”).
93 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (concluding that 
there is “no doubt that Amazon fits within the definition [of a “service provider” in the context of the § 
512(c) safe harbor].  . . .  Amazon operates web sites, provides retail and third party selling services to 
Internet users, and maintains computers to govern access to its web sites.  These activities fall squarely 
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¶32 Subsection (c) of § 512 protects service providers from liability for “infringement 
of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a 
system or network controlled or operated by . . . the service provider.”95  The Senate 
Report accompanying the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides several 
illuminating examples of specific activities which would be covered under this 
subsection: “Examples [of activities protected under § 512(c)] include providing server 
space for a user’s web site, for a chat room, or other forum in which material may be 
posted at the direction of users.”96  While none of these situations addresses music or 
video files per se, the class of entities which could conceivably “provide[] server space” 
is broad.  Moreover, the following page of the legislative history specifically provides the 
example of “online site[s] offering audio or video” in the context of § 512(c).97  Given 
these specific examples and the broad definition of “service provider,” it is not surprising 
that legal scholars have concluded that YouTube is an intended beneficiary of the 
§ 512(c) safe harbor,98 though it must still be determined whether its activities are 
sufficient to meet all of the safe harbor’s requirements. 
2. Termination Policy 
¶33 Second, a service provider may only avail itself of the § 512 safe harbors if the 
service provider has “adopted and reasonably implemented, and inform[ed] subscribers 
of . . . a policy that provides for the termination . . . of . . . account holders . . . who are 
 
within the broad scope of the § 512(k)(1)(B) definition of ‘service provider.’”).  The online retailer 
Amazon was accused of copyright infringement based on its “zShops” platform, an online forum hosted by 
Amazon where third party vendors sell products directly to online customers.  Id. at 1094.  In selling their 
products, zShops vendors could choose to include a product image either by creating a link to an image 
stored on the vendor’s computer or by uploading an image to an Amazon server.  Id.  Amazon did not 
preview or supervise the uploading or linking of the images.  Id.
94 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000) (assuming, but 
explicitly declining to hold, that Napster was a service provider under § 512(k)(1)(A)).  See also 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(k)(1)(B) (2006) (broadly defining ‘service provider’ as “a provider of online services”); Scott, supra 
note 76, at 140-41 (“The definition of [online service providers (OSP)] included in section 512(k)(1)(B) is 
broadly stated, and has been so interpreted by courts. The definition has been satisfied not just by 
conventional OSPs like AOL, but also by . . . payment processing services, age verification services, and a 
publisher of online real estate advertisements.”) (internal citations omitted). 
95 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).  
96 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 43 (1998) (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at 44 (“For example, the activity at an online site offering audio or video may be unauthorized 
public performance of a musical composition, a sound recording, or an audio-visual work, rather than (or in 
addition to) the creation of an unauthorized copy of any of these works.”).  This is not the only reference to 
online music contained in the legislative history.  See id. at 46 (“Thus, where a party is operating an 
unauthorized Internet jukebox from a particular site, it is not necessary for a compliant notification to list 
every musical composition or sound recording that has been or could be infringed at that site, so long as a 
representative list of those compositions or recordings is provided so that the service provider can 
understand the nature and scope of the infringement being claimed.”); id. at 48 (referring to “sound 
recordings, software, movies or books were available for unauthorized downloading, public performance or 
public display.”).
98 See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 30, at 266 (“Section 512(c) was directed at OSPs . . . such as . . . today’s 
YouTube or MySpace.”); Choi, supra note 39, at 407 (“[YouTube and other OSPs] are exempted from 
secondary liability under section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act . . . as long as they 
comply expeditiously in removing infringing material upon notification.”); Wu, supra note 75 (“Section 
512(c) . . . applies to . . . yes, YouTube.”). 
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repeat [copyright] infringers.”99  Under the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of this subsection, 
whether a service provider has satisfied the termination policy standard requires a three-
pronged inquiry: The service provider must have (1) adopted such a policy, (2) informed 
users of the policy; and (3) reasonably implemented the policy.100  YouTube’s policy is 
available to users on its web site, and tracks the statutory language fairly closely.101  
Thus, the first two prongs of the test seem to be satisfied.  Whether the policy has been 
reasonably implemented is a more difficult question, and case law is sparse.102  A 
modicum of insight can be gleaned from Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, where it was 
noted in dicta that a service provider’s failure to adequately record the contact 
information of entities associated with alleged infringement may constitute a failure to 
reasonably implement a termination policy.103  This conclusion is based on the simple 
logic that if no adequate record of infringers is maintained, it will be difficult to terminate 
such infringers. 
¶34 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Robertson suggested another way to run 
afoul of the reasonable implementation standard.104  The court noted that AOL had 
changed the e-mail address at which it received copyright infringement notifications, but 
had neither provided notification of the change nor arranged for e-mail forwarding from 
the old account.105  Thus, copyright infringement notifications sent by copyright owners 
would have “fall[en] into a vacuum,” making it difficult for AOL to become aware of 
potential infringements and terminate accounts where appropriate.  106
¶35 In an even more egregious example of failure to comply with the implementation 
standard, the service provider in Aimster could not implement its termination policy 
because it had deliberately prevented itself from becoming aware of specific infringing 
activity.  By encrypting the communications between users, Aimster was unable to 
determine who exchanged files, what files were exchanged, or when the files were 
exchanged.   The court had no tolerance for such maneuvering: “107 [A]dopting a repeat 
infringer policy and then purposely eviscerating any hope that such a policy could ever be 
carried out is not an ‘implementation’ as required by [the DMCA].”  108
¶36 In light of Ellison, Aimster, and CCBill, service providers are presumably taking 
greater care to avoid such obvious blunders.  Nevertheless, stumbling blocks may still 
arise.  For example, even if a service provider terminates a user’s account, there may be 
little to prevent that account holder from signing up for a new account.  This is a 
 
99 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1) (2006). 
100 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004); see also  Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004).  
101 YouTube, Terms of Use ¶ 7, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Aug. 31, 2007) (“YouTube 
will terminate a User’s access to its Website if, under appropriate circumstances, they are determined to be 
a repeat infringer.”). 
102 See Zittrain, supra note 30, at 277 (describing 512(i)’s termination policy as “curiously untested”). 
103 Perfect 10, Inc v CCBill, 481 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2007).   
104 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1080. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  Also important to the Ellison case was the district court finding that AOL had in any event never 
terminated anyone under the policy.  Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
rev’d in part, 357 F.3d at 1080. 
107 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252. F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
108 Id. 
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particular concern at free sites such as YouTube, where the barriers to creating new 
accounts may be especially low.  Currently, a user account at YouTube may be created in 
seconds by entering an email address and other basic information.109  YouTube does not 
appear to verify any of the information, other than the e-mail address (though by 
registering, users must agree to YouTube’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy).110  Thus, 
even if YouTube diligently terminates the accounts of repeat offenders, which it claims to 
do “automatically,”  the policy may be largely ineffective.111 112  Nevertheless, the statute 
does not require that service providers “effectively” terminate the accounts of repeat 
offenders, but that they “reasonably” do so.  So long as a service provider diligently 
responds to infringement notices and consistently terminates the accounts of repeat 
infringers, this should in most cases constitute reasonable implementation.    113
¶37 The analysis of whether methods exist to prevent infringers from re-registration, 
and whether such methods outweigh their costs, involve complicated technical and policy 
questions better addressed by Congress.  Congress could, for example, require service 
providers to implement “standard technical measures” to prevent users from re-
registering, just as is currently required in the context of identifying copyrighted 
works.114  It has not done so, however, so to require service providers to not only 
terminate the accounts of repeat infringers but also prevent them from reregistering goes 
beyond what is required under the statute, thus treading too closely to the safe harbor and 
creating uncertainty. 
3. Standard Technical Measures 
¶38 In its complaint, Viacom states that “YouTube . . . has decided to shift the burden 
entirely onto copyright owners to monitor the YouTube site . . . to detect infringing 
videos and send notice to YouTube demanding that it ‘take down’ the infringing 
works.”   However, Congress, not YouTube, has placed this burden on copyright 115
 
109  YouTube, Create Your YouTube Account, http://www.youtube.com/signup (last visited Aug. 31, 
2007). 
110 Id. 
111 YouTube, Help Center: What Are You Doing to Prevent Unauthorized Copyrighted Content from 
Appearing in YouTube?, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=55773&topic=10554 (last visited Nov. 16, 
2007) (“User accounts of repeat infringers are automatically terminated.”); see Does YouTube Make 
Google a Big Target For Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116049721244288215-
dh_XDre5B5O8j3fQQ2eaVvj6sxg_%2020061109.html?mod=tff_main_tff_top (“YouTube says it removes 
any videos with infringing content when notified and is rolling out a new system to automatically detect 
such material.”). 
112 On the other hand, it may be that even the simple hurdle of re-registration is sufficient to dissuade 
many users from engaging in infringing activity, or that experiencing account termination is in itself a 
shaming wake-up call and as such, an adequate deterrent.  Without more information, it would be 
premature to conclude that the ability to re-register by itself excludes a service provider from the 
protections of the safe harbor. 
113 Current case law does not require more.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 
(9th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases and holding “that a service provider ‘implements’ a policy if it has a 
working notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not 
actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to issue such notifications.”). 
114 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2006). 
115 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶ 6.   
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holders.116  The DMCA does not require active monitoring or “policing” of a service 
provider’s web site to come within safe harbor protection.  117
¶39 Although safe harbor eligibility is not predicated on active monitoring by service 
providers to detect infringing activity,118 service providers must “accommodate[], and . . . 
not interfere with standard technical measures” in order to fall within the section’s 
protections.119  Section 512(i) defines “standard technical measures” somewhat 
recursively as “technical measures that copyright owners use to identify or to protect 
copyrighted works.”120  This requirement apparently stems from Congress’ belief that the 
key to combating online copyright infringement lies in technology.121  Beyond these 
general statements, what constitutes a standard technical measure has not been developed 
by the case law.  It has been suggested that digital watermarks or copyright management 
systems might fall under this definition.122  However, the statute specifies that standard 
technical measures include only those measures that “have been developed pursuant to a 
broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, 
multi-industry standards process.”123  No “industry consensus” has yet resulted from a 
“multi-industry standards process.”124  So, although it is likely that watermarks and 
copyright management systems will one day fall into the category of standard technical 
measures, they do not do so today. 
¶40 Nevertheless, Viacom attempts to circumvent this difficulty by eschewing the term 
“standard technical measures” in favor of “reasonable measures,”125 “available copyright 
protection measures,”  or simply “measures.”126 127  The complaint alleges that YouTube 
“prevents copyright owners from finding on the YouTube site all of the infringing works 
from which YouTube profits,” and “has deliberately withheld the application of available 
 
116 See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1113 (“The DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing 
copyright infringement--identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting 
infringement--squarely on the owners of the copyright.”).
117 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition [safe harbor 
eligibility] on . . . a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating 
infringing activity . . . .”).  Note that this contrasts with the common law rule, which in some cases requires 
exercising the right to police in order to avoid vicarious liability.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).   
118 17 U.S.C. § 512(m). 
119 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2006).  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 
1146, 1176-77 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that active monitoring is not required “except to the extent 
consistent with a standard technical measure” (quoting H.R. REP. 105-551(II), at 53)). 
120 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2) (2006).   
121 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998) (“[T]echnology is likely to be the solution to many of the issues 
facing copyright owners . . . in this digital age.”).
122 See Raphael A. Gutierrez, Save the Slip for the Service Providers: Courts Should Not Give Short 
Shrift to the Safe Harbors of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 915 (2002) 
(“Examples of such technical measures include digital watermarks or copyright management systems.”). 
123 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2) (2006).   
124 See Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 n.18 (“[Because the industry has not even begun to discuss 
solutions,] [i]t thus appears to be an open question if any conduct or policy could interfere with ‘standard 
technical measures.’”); David Ludwig, Shooting the Messenger: ISP Liability for Contributory Copyright 
Infringement, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 110701, at n.48 (noting that no cases have had the 
occasion to further define the term “standard technical measures”).   
125 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶¶ 40, 45. 
126 Id. ¶ 7. 
127 Id. ¶ 28. 
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copyright protection measures.” 128  Specifically, Viacom alleges that YouTube’s practice 
of limiting the number of results returned for a given search to 1000 clips prevents 
copyright holders from identifying all of the infringing files available on the network.129  
In addition, YouTube has created a feature that allows users to privately share videos.130  
Because only those designated as “friends” by a user can view videos uploaded by that 
user, Viacom complains that copyright holders are unable find infringing videos shared 
using this feature.  131
¶41 Although these allegations may be correct, they have no bearing on whether 
YouTube has accommodated or interfered with “standard technical measures” but rather, 
whether it has accommodated or interfered with “available measures,” or at least, 
“measures.”  Conflating “measures” with “standard technical measures” would deny 
effect to the statutory language in § 512(i)(2)(A) and thus violate a cardinal principal of 
statutory construction.132  Even were that not the case, the definition of “standard 
technical measures” also excludes measures that “impose substantial costs on service 
providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks.”133  YouTube may be able 
to show, for example, that limiting search results to 1000 hits saves substantial costs by 
reducing the necessary computing capacity, or that the practice substantially improves 
network performance by reducing the amount of time it takes to display search results to 
users.   
¶42 The allegations regarding the “friends” feature raise public policy concerns, and 
courts should be chary of adopting their logic.  A substantial benefit accrues to the public 
from the ability to share files privately.  For example, although many people enjoy 
posting personal photographs, travel diaries, and other messages on publicly available 
websites or blogs, many others prefer to transmit such communications privately through 
e-mail or other means.  Similarly, many YouTube users may prefer for legitimate reasons 
to share audiovisual content privately.  Unfortunately, traditional methods of private 
video sharing are cumbersome and slow, such as creating videotapes and mailing them to 
intended recipients.  Sending video by e-mail attachment is faster, but file-size may 
prevent effective transmission.  Other methods such as FTP require technical knowledge 
not possessed by much of the general public.  YouTube’s “friends” feature allows 
ordinary people to quickly, easily, and privately exchange video files, thus providing a 
significant social benefit.    134
 
128 Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. 
129 Id. ¶ 43. 
130 YouTube, Help Center: Why Can’t My Friends See My Private Video?, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=77272 (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) 
(“Private videos and playlists can be viewed only by you and the people you’ve added to designated contact 
lists.”).  
131 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶ 43. 
132 See, e.g., Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1981) (“A 
basic principle of statutory construction is that ‘a statute should not be construed in such a way as to render 
certain provisions superfluous or insignificant.’” (quoting Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 
(D.C. Cir. 1976))).
133 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(C) (2006).  
134 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[P]rivacy is a social 
benefit . . . .”); cf.  Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An 
Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2007)  (concluding that “the added social welfare from [music] 
file sharing is likely to be quite high”). 
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¶43 Moreover, the “friends” feature can be distinguished from Aimster’s network 
design, which the Aimster court viewed as part of scheme to encourage copyright 
infringement.135  Recall that Aimster included an encryption feature as part of its free 
software that allowed users to exchange music files privately.136  Denouncing this tactic, 
the court noted Aimster’s “ostrich-like refusal to discover the extent to which its system 
was being used to infringe copyright”  and pointed out that “137 Aimster [had] failed to 
show that its service [was] ever used for any purpose other than to infringe . . .  
copyrights.”138  Clearly, encryption solely for the purpose of illegal file sharing can 
hardly be justified on the basis of social benefit.  In contrast, if YouTube can show that a 
meaningful number of users legitimately use the “friends” feature to keep private content 
private rather than to evade copyright infringement detection, the YouTube court should 
look favorably upon the feature.      
B.  Additional Requirements of Section 512(c) Safe Harbor Protection 
1. Knowledge 
¶44 Viacom alleges that “YouTube . . . knowingly reproduces and publicly performs 
the copyrighted works uploaded to its site.”139  Viacom will seek to demonstrate that 
YouTube does not deserve the protections of the safe harbors established by the DMCA, 
since the protections are available only to the extent that the service providers are 
“innocent.”140  A service provider is not innocent (and will not be able to take refuge in 
the safe harbor of § 512(c)) if it has “actual knowledge that the material . . . on the . . . 
network is infringing.”141  Even in the absence of actual knowledge of infringement, a 
service provider will not be immune from liability if it is “aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent.”142  However, the standard for determining 
whether a service provider has such apparent knowledge is an elevated one: A service 
provider will only be deemed to have apparent knowledge if that service provider 
“deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it was aware.”    143
Examples of such blatant infringement may include statements from the vendor 
that a product is bootlegged or pirated, chat rooms hosted by the service provider 
 
135 Id. at 655 (“Far from doing anything to discourage repeat infringers of the plaintiffs’ copyrights, 
Aimster invited them to do so, showed them how they could do so with ease using its system, and by 
teaching its users how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of copyrighted materials disabled itself from 
doing anything to prevent infringement.”). 
136 Id. at 646; see supra Part IV(A)(2). 
137 Id. at 655. 
138 Id. at 653.     
139 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 
140 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[The immunity 
provided by the DMCA], however, is not presumptive, but granted only to ‘innocent’ service providers 
who can prove they do not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement.”). 
141 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006).   
142 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).   
143 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (quoting 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12B.04[A][1], at 12B-49 (Matthew 
Bender & Co. 1995); “[A]pparent knowledge requires evidence that a service provider ‘turned a blind eye 
to “red flags” of obvious infringement.’” Id. at 1108 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 57.).        
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in which users discuss how the service can be used to circumvent copyright laws, 
or the offering of hundreds of audio files in a single day for peer to peer 
copying.144   
¶45  At the other extreme, the Senate Report provides some illuminating commentary 
with respect to the knowledge standard and activity that falls clearly outside the safe 
harbor of § 512(d) : 145
The important intended objective of this [apparent knowledge] standard is to 
exclude sophisticated “pirate” directories-which refer Internet users to other 
selected Internet sites where pirate software, books, movies, and music can be 
downloaded or transmitted-from the safe harbor.  Such pirate directories refer 
Internet users to sites that are obviously infringing because they typically use 
words such as “pirate,” “bootleg,” or slang terms in their uniform resource 
locator (URL) and header information to make their illegal purpose obvious to 
the pirate directories and other Internet users.  Because the infringing nature of 
such sites would be apparent from even a brief and casual viewing, safe harbor 
status for a provider that views such a site and then establishes a link to it would 
not be appropriate.146
It is apparent from the quoted text that Congress specifically contemplated sites illegally 
offering copyrighted audiovisual and musical works for download, and sought to exclude 
from the safe harbor service providers that create directories linking to such sites.  The 
activities described in the quoted passage stand in sharp contrast to the activities of 
YouTube.  Although user-posted copyrighted material is available on YouTube, 
YouTube has not assembled and provided users with a directory list of “obviously 
infringing” sites.  Unlike pirate sites which may have the word “pirate” or “bootleg” in 
the URL or on the site itself, thus clearly indicating that the works are almost certainly 
both copyrighted and unauthorized, the YouTube site contains videos that may or may 
not violate the copyrights of others. 
¶46 The determination of whether or not a particular video infringes a copyright is a 
challenging one.  First, soundtracks or other content contained within amateur YouTube 
videos may be authorized by the copyright holders.  At least four musical rights 
organizations — Universal Music Group, Warner Music, BMG, and the British society 
MCPS-PRS Alliance — have signed deals with YouTube that authorize the use of at least 
some of their songs in user-generated YouTube videos.   Second, even professional 147
 
144 Id. at 1105 (internal citations omitted).  
145 Although this commentary is directly applicable to providers of “information location tools” under 
section 512(d), this section is in pari materia to § 512(c) and so may serve to illuminate the meaning of that 
section as well.  See United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he canon in pari 
materia . . . provides that similar statutes are to be interpreted in a similar manner unless legislative history 
or purpose suggests material differences.”); Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 294-95 (R.I. 2007) (“It is 
an especially well-settled principle of statutory construction that when . . . faced with statutory provisions 
that are in pari materia, we construe them in a manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is 
consistent with their general objective scope.”).
146 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 48 (1998) (emphasis added).   
147 See Sanders & Alpert, supra note 18, at 11 (Warner Music); Laura M. Holson, Hollywood Asks 
YouTube: Friend or Foe?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/technology/15youtube.html (Universal Music Group); YouTube 
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music videos or prime-time content such as clips from CBS’s hit television series 
“Survivor” may in fact be authorized for YouTube viewing by the copyright owner.148  
Third, even where content is unauthorized, its use may not be illegal.  The determination 
of whether a particular video infringes a copyright involves a sophisticated legal analysis 
where reasonable people may differ on the application of originality,  fair use149 150 
(including transformative use ), and public domain.151 152  For instance, a video clip of a 
wedding may be “original” but extensive filming of the stained glass windows in the 
church could be a copyright infringement or fair use.  A significant issue with the fair use 
defense is the fact-sensitive aspect of its application.  A political parody may borrow 
copyrighted music and be transformative enough to constitute fair use.   Hence, each 153
 
Strikes Content Deals, USATODAY.COM, Oct. 9, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-09-
youtube-deals_x.htm (BMG); Associated Press, YouTube Signs Licensing Deal with British Composers’ 
Group, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/30/business/youtube.php (reporting a deal between YouTube and a 
British rights society that allows more than ten million songs to be used legally on the British version of the 
YouTube site). 
148 YouTube Strikes Content Deals, USATODAY.COM, Oct. 9, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-09-youtube-deals_x.htm.   
149 For the work to be “original” it must be “independently created by the author” and possess “some 
minimal degree of creativity.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).    
150 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  The statutory factors for the fair use test are “the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the 
nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.” Id.  See generally Stanford Law School, Ctr. for Internet and Society, The Fair Use 
Project, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/taxonomy/term/374 (defining “fair use”).   
151See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The fair use doctrine thus 
‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would 
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 
236 (1990))) (bracketed language in original); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 552-553 (1985) (“[F]air use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.  The nature of the 
interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is fair.”) (internal citations omitted).  For an 
application of the fair use doctrine, see Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007), in 
which the court held that a Google user’s search that displayed thumbnail images of a copyrighted work 
(owned by adult entertainment company, Perfect 10) was fair use under the Copyright Act because of the 
transformative nature of Google’s search engine.  The Ninth Circuit instructed the lower court to find 
contributory liability on internet service providers in instances where there is proof of actual knowledge of 
specific instances of infringement, and to consider the effect of the service provider defense under § 512 of 
the DMCA. The court stated, “We conclude that the significantly transformative nature of Google’s search 
engine, particularly in light of its public benefit, outweighs Google’s superseding and commercial uses of 
the thumbnails in this case. In reaching this conclusion, we note the importance of analyzing fair use 
flexibly in light of new circumstances.” Id. at 723. 
152 In general, stating that a work is “in the public domain” means that the “work . . . belongs to the 
public as a whole.” MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1 § 1.05 (1997).  
Works that were never copyrighted are in the public domain and include facts, unoriginal works and works 
of the U.S. government.  In addition, formerly copyrighted works whose terms of copyright protection have 
expired are also said to be in the public domain.  Currently, works produced or published on or before 
December 31, 1922 are in the public domain due to copyright term expiration. See Scott J. Burnham, 
Copyright in Library-Held Materials: A Decision Tree for Librarians, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 425, 434 (2004) 
(“Because the second term of a work created in 1922 ended in 1997 and was not saved by the Sonny Bono 
Act, it is in the public domain. The second term of a work created in 1923 ended in 1998, so it was saved 
by the Act and its expiration date was extended to 2018. Therefore . . . works created before 1922 are now 
in the public domain . . . .”).  
153 See, e.g., Video, George Bush and Tony Blair — My Endless Love (2007), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNpoS6jOty4. 
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alleged instance of infringement must be independently analyzed by legal counsel.  One 
can readily appreciate the daunting magnitude of this task for the larger social networking 
sites such as YouTube, where tens of thousands of new files are posted daily.154  
Congress appreciated this difficulty and sought to avoid it by clearly explaining that the 
termination policy requirement was not intended to “undermine the knowledge standard   
. . . by suggesting that a provider must . . . make difficult judgments as to whether 
conduct is or is not infringing.”  155
¶47 Thus, although it is widely believed that a substantial amount of the content on 
YouTube is infringing,156 the nature of social networking sites like YouTube contrasts 
sharply with that of the “pirate sites” targeted by Congress.  A large amount of 
YouTube’s content either does not infringe or may not infringe.  Some has been licensed 
from copyright owners or their representatives, some constitutes parody or is otherwise a 
fair use of copyrighted works, and some includes homemade videos where the YouTube 
user is herself the copyright holder.   
2. Take Down Requirements 
¶48 Strictly applied, the actual and apparent knowledge provisions would preclude 
immunity if a copyright holder notified the service provider of infringing material 
residing on its network, or if the service provider otherwise came to be aware of the 
infringing material.  Such a strict application of the statute would inevitably lead to the 
imposition of liability even for well-intentioned service providers.  For example, service 
providers proactively choosing to locate and remove infringing content would lose the 
protection of the statute the moment they uncovered it, since at that moment they would 
have “actual knowledge” of the infringing material.  The DMCA therefore allows service 
providers to remain within the safe harbor, even after becoming aware of infringing 
material contained on the network, so long as the service provider “acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material.”157  Once the site has been duly notified of the 
alleged copyright infringement, generally by a DMCA-compliant cease and desist letter 
 
154 YouTube users currently upload more than 65,000 new videos daily.  Kevin J. Delaney & Ethan 
Smith, YouTube Model Is Compromise Over Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115862128600366836-
pJip_NHyQ7j0b44svDZ2kgHCYfs_20070918.html.  
155 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998).   
156 See, e.g., Sam Gustin, YouTube’s Got a Fat Idea of Itself, N.Y. POST, Sept. 21, 2006, at 40 (averring 
that the “vast majority of content viewed on YouTube violates copyright law — 90 percent by one 
estimate”); Holson, supra note 147 (“[A]cademics and media executives estimate [unauthorized content on 
YouTube to] be anywhere from 30 percent to 70 percent.”). But see YouTube Deletes 30,000 Files After a 
Copyright Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C4 (“Most videos posted on YouTube are 
homemade.”).  
157 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006).  Parallel “take-down” 
provisions are provided in other subsections of the DMCA including § 512(d)(1)(C) & (d)(3) (Information 
Location Tools).  An analogous provision is provided in § 512(b)(2)(B) (System Caching), by which an 
entity engaged in system caching, in order to remain within the safe harbor, must comply with rules for 
refreshing “or other updating of material when specified by the person making the material available 
online.”  To understand this provision, imagine that a web site providing infringing material is ordered by a 
court to remove that material.  A third party entity engaged in system caching of that web site would still 
retain the infringing material in its cache, vitiating the effectiveness of the court’s order.  A requirement 
that the entity engaged in system caching update its cache helps to ensure that the infringing material is 
effectively rendered unavailable.    
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identifying the copyright owner’s works that have been infringed, the site has an 
obligation to “expeditiously . . .  remove, or disable access to the material that is claimed 
to be infringing”  or risk losing the safe harbor protection of § 512.158 159  The take down 
notification must be in writing and must (1) be signed by the copyright owner or her 
agent, (2) identify the copyrighted work(s) claimed to have been infringed, (3) identify 
the material that is claimed to be infringing (4) include contact information for the 
complaining party, (5) include a statement that the complaining party has a good faith 
belief that use of the material has not been authorized, and (6) include a statement that the 
information contained in the notice is accurate and that the complaining party has the 
right to assert the copyright.  Notices which are not “substantially” compliant are 
ineffective.160  However, as long as the notice identifies the infringing works and the 
infringed works and provides contact information (elements (2), (3), and (4), above), the 
party receiving notice is obligated to attempt to contact the complaining party to request 
the missing information.    161
¶49 YouTube claims that it immediately complies with such requests162 and has 
received considerable press for its compliance with some of the larger take-down 
requests.163  Although copyright owners may be unhappy with the effectiveness of their 
takedown requests,164 it appears that YouTube is largely within the bounds of this portion 
of the safe harbor.     
 
158 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006).   
159 Note that the site is not obligated to remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing material.  If 
it fails to do so, however, its liability will be determined under general principles of copyright law without 
the benefit of the § 512 safe harbors.  See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45 (“[T]he service provider is free to 
refuse to ‘take down’ the material or site, even after receiving a notification of claimed infringement from 
the copyright owner; in such a situation, the service provider’s liability, if any, will be decided without 
reference to section 512(c).”).   
160 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (2006). 
161 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).   
162 Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target For Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116049721244288215-
dh_XDre5B5O8j3fQQ2eaVvj6sxg_%2020061109.html (“YouTube says it removes any videos with 
infringing content when notified . . . .”); For YouTube, a System to Halt Copyright-Infringing Videos, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 28, 2007, at C6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/28/business/28google.html;  
YouTube Deletes 30,000 Files After a Copyright Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C4 (noting that 
YouTube “quickly complied with the request to remove the copyright materials” by a group of Japanese 
entertainment companies).  A lawyer for YouTube has informed U.S. District Judge Louis L. Stanton that it 
is working “very intensely and cooperating with the major content companies” on video recognition 
technology that would allow owners of videos to provide a digital fingerprint that would allow YouTube to 
remove the video within a minute or so. YouTube to Use Copyright Checker in Fall, CHINAVIEW.CN, July 
30, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-07/30/content_6449924.htm.  This may be relevant to 
the injunctive relief issue at the Viacom v. YouTube trial but not necessarily to the issue of damages for past 
copyright violations. 
163 Noam Cohen, YouTube is Purging Copyrighted Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C8, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/technology/30youtube.html (noting YouTube’s compliance with take-
down requests from Comedy Central as well as its removal of 30,000 clips one week earlier YouTube);  
Deletes 30,000 Files After a Copyright Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/21/technology/21youtube.html (noting YouTube’s quick compliance 
with a the take-down request of a Japanese entertainment group). Moreover, YouTube has apparently 
complied with the take-down provisions from the very beginning of its corporate existence in 2005.  See 
Dawn C. Chmielewski, Studios Not Sure Whether Web Video Innovator Is Friend or Foe, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
10, 2006, at C1 (“By all accounts, it [YouTube] acts like a responsible corporate citizen when asked to 
remove copyrighted works.”). 
164 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶ 41.   
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3. Financial Benefit 
¶50 Even if a service provider has no knowledge of the infringing material (or, upon 
learning of the infringement, acts expeditiously to remove the material), safe harbor 
protection is nevertheless unavailable if the service provider (1) has the right and ability 
to control the illegal activity and (2) receives a “financial benefit directly attributable to 
the infringing activity.”    165
¶51 The right and ability to control the illegal activity refers to more than just the right 
and ability to remove material after the fact, but “presupposes some antecedent ability to 
limit or filter copyrighted material.”166  Thus, it has been held that Amazon did not have 
the right and ability to control third party vendor sales taking place via Amazon’s online 
marketplace, where Amazon was never in possession of the products, did not preview the 
products prior to their listing, and “did not otherwise involve itself in the sale[s].”167  In 
contrast, the right and ability to control has been found where a provider of online age 
verification services “refused to allow sites to use its system until they compl[ied] with its 
[requirements with respect to site layout, appearance, and content.]”168   Postings to 
YouTube are extensively automated, with little or no involvement from the service 
provider.  It is true that those wishing to upload videos to YouTube must first register, but 
registration is a quick and simple process that does not appear to contain any mechanism 
for screening out would-be registrants.169  Nor is there a process for filtering infringing or 
otherwise inappropriate videos as they are uploaded,170 although YouTube has been 
promising content-screening technology since 2006.171  Given that YouTube prescreens 
neither registrants nor videos, YouTube’s circumstances seem closer to those of Amazon. 
 
165 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006).  Outside of the § 512 safe harbor, courts have differed with respect 
to the requirement that the financial benefit be direct.  See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green 
Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306-09 (2d Cir. 1963); Polygram Int’l Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc. 855 F.Supp. 
1314, 1326 (D. Mass. 1994) (explaining that vicarious liability is permitted where the financial benefit is 
either direct or indirect). 
166 Tur v. YouTube, No. CV064436, 2007 WL 1893635, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007). See also 
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“Courts have routinely 
held that the right and ability to control infringing activity, ‘as the concept is used in the DMCA, cannot 
simply mean the ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on its website or 
stored in its system.’” (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1098 
(C.D.Cal.2004))).  
167 Corbis, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1110.   
168 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
169 See supra Part IV (A)(2).  
170 YouTube uploads are limited to ten minutes and 100 megabytes, however.  YouTube, Help Center: 
How Long/Large Can My Video Be?, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=55743&topic=10527 (“All videos 
uploaded to YouTube have a 100MB file size limit.  The longer the video is, the more compression will be 
required to fit it into that size.  For that reason, most videos on YouTube are under five minutes long and 
there is a 10-minute length limit for all videos.”).   
171 Alex Viega, Anti-Piracy System Could Hurt YouTube, SFGATE.COM, Oct. 12, 2006, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2006/10/12/financial/f133411D49.DTL; see also Kevin 
J. Delaney & Ethan Smith, YouTube Model Is Compromise Over Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115862128600366836-
pJip_NHyQ7j0b44svDZ2kgHCYfs_20070918.html  (“YouTube is rolling out technology designed to 
automatically spot copyrighted material that users upload without the permission of media companies, and 
then to share ad revenue with those companies.”). 
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¶52 Although there is no bright-line rule to determine whether or not a benefit received 
by the service provider is “direct,” some general guidance has evolved from the case law 
and legislative history.  If users pay a fixed fee, regardless of illegal activity, a finding of 
direct benefit is less likely.   Commentary from the Senate Report buttresses this rule: 172
[R]eceiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments for service from a 
person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving a 
‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.’ Nor is 
subparagraph (B) [of § 512(c)(1)] intended to cover fees based on the length of 
the message (per number of bytes, for example) or by connect time.173
YouTube’s services are provided to users for free; YouTube instead generates revenue 
from advertisers whose advertisements are displayed alongside user videos.  Each time an 
infringing video is played, YouTube generates revenue from the associated 
advertisement.  Thus, in a literal sense, some portion of YouTube’s revenues is directly 
attributable to infringing activity.  Stopping the analysis at this point and finding a direct 
financial benefit leads to a perverse result:  if YouTube charges its users a periodic fee to 
use its services, whether they upload infringing videos or not, it would not receive a 
direct financial benefit under the Senate Report’s formulation; however, if revenue is 
generated from advertising, with exactly the same users posting exactly the same videos, 
a direct financial benefit would be found.  This interpretation imposes artificial 
constraints on a service provider’s revenue generation model without producing any 
concomitant benefits in copyright violation reduction.   
¶53 If the analysis is carried a bit further, however, the appropriateness of Congress’ 
formulation becomes apparent.  A business model based on flat user fees gives the 
service provider little or no incentive to condone infringement.  In contrast, a revenue 
model based on advertisement gives a service provider every reason to condone 
infringement, at least if the service provider believes that continued infringement will 
attract more users and thereby increase its advertising revenue.174  This is likely the 
rationale behind the rule that if “infringing activity constitutes a draw for subscribers” a 
direct financial benefit is more likely to be found.    175
 
172 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (“[W]here a defendant rents space or services on a fixed rental fee that does not depend on the nature 
of the activity of the lessee, courts usually find no vicarious liability because there is no direct financial 
benefit from the infringement.”). 
173 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44-45 (1998).  The Senate Report went on to caution that the direct financial 
benefit “would however, include any such fees where the value of the service lies in providing access to 
infringing material.”  Id. at 45.
174 This is consistent with the rule that a landlord generally is liable for the infringements of the tenant if 
the rental rate is based on a proportion of the tenant’s sales, but not if the rental rate is fixed.  See, e.g., 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1963).
175 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004).  An earlier formulation of the same rule 
can be found in Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F.Supp. at 1377, where the court implied that if infringing 
activity “enhances the value of . . . services” or “attracts new subscribers,” a finding of direct financial 
benefit is more likely.  See also Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, No. 00 CIV. 4660, 2002 WL 1997918, 
at *11 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 29, 2002) (“Infringement which increases a defendant’s user base or otherwise acts 
as a draw for customers constitutes a direct financial interest.”).
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¶54 In 2004, the Ninth Circuit’s significant and questionable statement that the “draw” 
need not even be “substantial”176 established a precedent that is now being followed by 
other courts.177  This is a troubling development.  Illegal uses of a technology will very 
frequently draw some users to that technology.178  If a copyright owner were to visit 
YouTube, MySpace, Facebook — or almost any site where users are able to post music, 
photos, or video files — and discovered illegal material on that web site, the copyright 
owner would be able to tautologically argue that the infringing activity had drawn those 
users who are viewing or otherwise using or consuming the infringing material.  This 
would effectively condemn an entire category of business model, regardless of the extent 
to which those sites cooperate with copyright owners or seek in good faith to prevent 
infringement.   
¶55 In YouTube’s case, the question of whether the draw must be substantial is largely 
academic.  Commentators seem to agree that the amount of infringing material on 
YouTube is in any case substantial (and, by some accounts, overwhelming),179 and that 
the infringing material has contributed significantly to YouTube’s rapid rise from start-up 
to multibillion dollar company.180  Thus, even if the draw did need to be substantial, 
YouTube would still probably run afoul of this portion of the rule.  Not surprisingly, 
Viacom repeatedly asserts in its complaint that the infringing material available on 
YouTube draws traffic to the YouTube site.181  While infringing activity on YouTube no 
doubt draws users — probably a substantial number of them — to the site, this alone will 
not prevent taking refuge in the safe harbor.  It must still be proven that YouTube had the 
right and ability to control the illegal activity, a difficult showing to make, as discussed 
above. 
V.  LIABILITY IN THE ABSENCE OF SAFE HARBOR PROTECTION 
¶56 The DMCA did not create a new standard for online copyright infringement.  
Instead, as the Fourth Circuit has noted, it “merely added a second step to assessing 
infringement liability for Internet service providers, after it is determined whether they 
are infringers in the first place under the preexisting Copyright Act.”   As a practical 182
 
176 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079  (“The essential aspect of the ‘direct financial benefit’ inquiry is whether 
there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps, 
regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a defendant’s overall profits.”).  
177 See, e.g., Parker v. Google, No. 06-3074, 2007 WL 1989660, at *4 (3d Cir. July 10, 2007) (quoting 
Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079, with approval); IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C06-03926, 2007 
WL 1113800, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007).
178 See Yen, supra note 30, at 829 (“[T]he possibility of infringement generally increases demand for the 
technology and the provider’s profits.”). 
179 See Gustin, supra note 156; Holson, supra note 147.  
180 See Chmielewski, supra note 163, at C1 (“ YouTube clearly benefits from the occasional copyright 
slip”; YouTube “traffic shot up 85%” after airing of a copyrighted clip); Gordon Kelly, YouTube to Auto-
Block Copyrighted Content, TRUSTEDREVIEWS.COM, Aug. 1, 2007, 
http://www.trustedreviews.com/multimedia/news/2007/08/01/YouTube-To-Auto-Block-Copyrighted-Content/p1 (“If 
we’re honest one of the biggest perks of YouTube is being able to watch a sneaky music video here or 
episode of our favourite show there . . . .”). 
181 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶¶ 5, 33, 34, 37, 39, 43, 
& 85.  
182 CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004). See 17 U.S.C. § 512(l) (2006) 
(“The failure of a service provider’s conduct to qualify for limitation of liability under this section shall not 
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matter, most courts faced with the question have chosen to first evaluate the defendant’s 
ability to fit within the DMCA’s safe harbors.183  If the defendant is eligible for safe 
harbor protection, the inquiry ends and the defendant is subject only to the remedies 
specified in § 512(j); if not, the complicated determinations of secondary and direct 
liability must be made.  It is not difficult to understand why courts prefer to make a safe 
harbor determination before going down the muddled path of secondary liability.   
¶57 As previously discussed, safe harbor protection may be unavailable for a variety of 
reasons.  Only “service providers” are eligible for § 512 safe harbor protection, which 
protection can be lost, for example, if the service provider fails to remove infringing 
material under § 512(c)(1)(C), fails to reasonably implement a termination policy under 
§ 512(i)(1)(A), or receives a direct financial benefit while having the right and ability to 
control infringing activity.184  If safe harbor protection is unavailable, a court must then 
conduct a traditional copyright infringement analysis.   
A.  Direct Infringement or Fair Use?   
¶58 Before there can be secondary liability, there must be primary liability based on a 
direct infringement.185  Direct infringement, in turn, will not be found if the use made 
does not fall within the scope of the copyright holder’s exclusive rights,186 nor if the 
defense of fair use applies.    187
¶59 Fair use is a statutory right given to the public to use a copyrighted work for limited 
purposes such as research or criticism during the work’s protected period of the author’s 
life, plus seventy years.188  The copyright holder’s exclusive rights, such as the right of 
reproduction, are therefore not absolute but are subject to the significant exceptions 
 
bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider’s 
conduct is not infringing under this title or any other defense.”); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998) (“Rather 
than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of [certain copyright] doctrines, the Committee decided to 
leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of ‘safe harbors,’ for certain common 
activities of service providers.”).
183 See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087-88 (C.D. Cal. 2001).   
184  Because only “service providers” are eligible for § 512 safe harbor protection, companies providing 
technology that could be delivered as a free-standing product or service (software, for example) may 
instead opt to develop a business model more conducive to “service provider” status.  The “service 
provider” requirement is thus not business-model neutral, suggesting that it may hinder the optimal 
development of certain technologies by inducing companies to offer in an online format what might be 
more effectively provided as a stand-alone product or service.   
185 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429, 434 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (“To 
prevail, [plaintiffs] have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax have infringed their copyrights 
and that [the manufacturer of the Betamax] should be held responsible for that infringement.”); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2  (9th Cir. 2001) (“Secondary liability for copyright 
infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement by a third party.”); Lichtman & Landes, 
supra note 20, at 403 n.27 (2003) (“[I]ndirect liability traditionally requires that the copyright holder first 
prove a specific act of infringement.”).  
186 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
187 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
188 Id.  See also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Originally, as 
a judicial doctrine without any statutory basis, fair use was an infringement that was excused — this is 
presumably why it was treated as a defense. As a statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an 
infringement. Thus, since the passage of the 1976 Act, fair use should no longer be considered an 
infringement to be excused; instead, it is logical to view fair use as a right.”).   
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embodied within the fair use doctrine.189  No bright-line rule exists to determine whether 
a given use is “fair.”  Instead, the Copyright Act enumerates four factors to be considered 
in making a fair use determination:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work [including whether it is primarily creative or primarily factual]; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.190
Although they are all important considerations, the fourth factor, proof that the use would 
not diminish the actual or potential value of the copyrighted work, is given considerable 
weight and has been described as “the most important and indeed the central fair use 
factor,”191 though the Supreme Court has since emphasized that all four factors must be 
“explored . . . and weighed together.”192  Moreover, the technological environment and 
particular technological innovations can and should be considered when making a fair use 
determination.193
¶60 Among the exclusive rights claimed by Viacom to be infringed is the right to 
publicly perform the work.194  However, in the vast majority of cases, videos posted by 
users to YouTube have extremely limited viewership, casting doubt on whether the use 
would constitute “public performance.”195  Nevertheless, by uploading works to the 
YouTube site, users are causing the work to be reproduced, which is also among a 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights,196 so fair use must still be considered.  While an 
exhaustive fair use analysis of the myriad types of videos available on YouTube is 
beyond the scope of this paper, a few points are worth mentioning.  Some use of 
copyrighted content on YouTube is clearly illegal, such as breaking up the entire film “8 
Mile” into twelve nine-minute segments and posting each of them on YouTube.197  Even 
where only a small portion of a copyrighted work is uploaded, this does not necessarily 
render the use fair.    198
 
189 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (2006). 
190 Although four factors are described in § 107, other factors may also be considered by the court as 
appropriate.  DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (N.D. Tex. 1995). 
191 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1992). 
192 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994); but see Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 
244, 258 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the Campbell decision as a “retreat[] from [the Supreme Court’s] 
earlier cases suggesting that the fourth statutory factor is the most important element of fair use.”).  
193 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The legislative 
history of section 107 suggests that courts should adapt the fair use exception to accommodate new 
technological innovations.”).
194 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶ 47.    
195 Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target For Copyright Suits? 
October 11, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116049721244288215-
dh_XDre5B5O8j3fQQ2eaVvj6sxg_%2020061109.html (“[M]ost items on YouTube have an audience 
close to zero.”).   
196 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).   
197 See Holson, supra note 147.  
198 Sanders & Alpert, supra note 18, at 8 (citing Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, 
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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¶61 Although many uses of copyrighted content will not be fair uses, in general the 
doctrine of fair use should be liberally applied in the context of social networking sites.  
For example, it is currently the case that “[a] broadcast of a sports clip with music during 
network news requires payment of performance royalties — even if the music is barely 
audible over the routine and sports commentary.”199  Courts should be cautious in 
extending this rule to the social networking or video sharing environment.  If a proud 
parent wants to post a video on YouTube of her child performing a dance routine to 
copyrighted music, so that distant friends and family (or even anyone in the world who so 
wishes) may view it, this should, in most cases, be considered a fair use of the 
copyrighted background music so long as the posting would not likely affect the potential 
market for the work.200  This might be the case, for example, if the music in the video is 
of such quality that few users would consider it a substitute for the original work or if it 
would be practically impossible for users to search for and locate the musical work.  
There is an obvious benefit to facilitating the sharing of such works, and where such 
sharing does not cause economic injury to the copyright holder, it should be allowed as a 
fair use.201  This is “consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest 
possible access to information . . . .”202  Finally, even if such economically harmless uses 
of copyrighted works do not constitute fair use by the end-user, they should weigh 
against a finding of secondary liability.  203
¶62 The effect on the market value of the posted copyrighted material is a critical factor 
under the fair use doctrine.  The copyright owner/plaintiff would have to rebut the fair 
 
199 Id. (citing Coleman v. ESPN, 764 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).  
200 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); Kelly v. ArribaSoft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821-
22 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Arriba’s use of thumbnail images would not harm the copyright holder’s 
ability to sell the full-sized images, and concluding that such use was fair use); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Netcom’s use, though 
commercial, also benefits the public in allowing for the functioning of the Internet and the dissemination of 
other creative works, a goal of the Copyright Act.”); see also Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target 
For Copyright Suits? 
October 11, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116049721244288215-
dh_XDre5B5O8j3fQQ2eaVvj6sxg_%2020061109.html (quoting Harvard law professor John Palfrey: “My 
hope would be that YouTube users are given wide latitude [in using others’ sound recordings in the users’ 
videos], so long as the market for the work was not adversely affected . . . .”). 
201 This argument presupposes that the use of the music during the child’s initial performance was in 
accordance with copyright law, either by paying the appropriate licensing fee or through fair use.  See Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (finding fair use 
where there was “no accompanying reduction in the market for [the] original work.”).  Of course, if those 
posting videos to YouTube are sharing in YouTube advertising revenues, such for-profit activity would 
militate against a finding of fair use.  See Rick Aristotle Munarriz, Show Me the Money, YouTube, Jul. 19, 
2007, http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2007/07/19/show-me-the-money-youtube.aspx (“YouTube [] 
introduce[d] revenue-sharing for the site’s most popular contributors two months ago.”). 
202 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
203 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998) (“The [Senate] Committee [on the Judiciary] recognizes that there 
are different degrees of online copyright infringement, from the inadvertent to the noncommercial, to the 
willful and commercial. In addition, the Committee does not intend [to] suggest[] that a provider must 
investigate possible infringements, monitor its service, or make difficult judgments as to whether conduct is 
or is not infringing.”); see generally David Nimmer, An Odyssey Through Copyright’s Vicarious Defenses,  
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1998) (noting that courts have not taken a consistent approach to whether an end-
user’s fair use defense benefits an alleged secondary infringer, or whether the secondary infringer’s fair use 
defense must be analyzed separately).  
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use defense that the market of its music or video would not be jeopardized by its 
unauthorized use.  This becomes especially difficult when the work has been transformed 
and has taken on a new meaning as in a parody or political satire that uses copyrighted 
material.  Even the posting of a copyrighted sporting event for a limited period would 
probably not dissuade people from attending games.204  Indeed, it may even create a 
larger market. 
¶63 In any event, YouTube’s stated policy is to promptly remove videos containing 
soundtracks owned by a record label where permission has not been granted.205  If strictly 
applied, this policy would leave no room for fair use postings of copyrighted content.  
YouTube thus has a stated policy that is legally conservative and tends to err on the side 
of greater copyright protection.  In particular, YouTube takes this conservative position 
with respect to so-called “mash-ups,” where a user integrates various works by splicing 
them together.206  While such works would likely be classified as derivative works and 
thus subject to the exclusive rights of copyright holders,207 some mash-ups may be strong 
candidates for a fair use defense.    208
¶64 Finally, Viacom contends that YouTube itself is directly infringing copyrights by 
publicly performing, displaying, and reproducing its copyrighted works.209  This 
argument has been addressed and rejected by several courts, and is not likely to 
succeed.    210
B.  The Grokster Business Model and Secondary Liability 
¶65 Grokster distributed free software that allows users to engage in peer-to-peer file 
sharing without the need for a central server.211  The software could be used to exchange 
any type of digital file, but the court found that the prominent use of the software was to 
 
204 Cf. Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical 
Analysis, 115 J.  POL. ECON. 1, Feb. 2007 (concluding that “file sharing has no statistically significant effect 
on purchases of the average album in our sample.”).   
205 YouTube, Copyright Tips, http://www.youtube.com/t/howto_copyright (“For example, if you use an 
audio track of a sound recording owned by a record label without that record label’s permission, your video 
is infringing the copyrights of others, and we will take it down as soon as we become aware of it.”). 
206 Id. (“It doesn’t matter if you created a video made of short clips of copyrighted content — even 
though you edited it together, the content is still copyrighted [and will be taken down].”).   
207 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).   
208 See, e.g., YouTube, George Bush and Tony Blair — My Endless Love, supra note 153. 
209 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 6, ¶ 23, 47, 53 & 59.  
210 See CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n ISP who owns an 
electronic facility that responds automatically to users’ input is not a direct infringer.”); ALS Scan, Inc. v. 
RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As to direct infringement, liability is ruled out 
for passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated by another.”); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“[D]efendants must actively 
engage in one of the activities recognized in the Copyright Act.”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line 
Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Plaintiff’s theory [that BBS operator 
directly infringed copyrights] would create many separate acts of infringement and, carried to its natural 
extreme, would lead to unreasonable liability.”); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, 
1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Fire Equip. Distributors & Nw. Nexus, Inc., 
983 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (discussing Netcom with approval).  In addition, The 
Communications Decency Act suggests a similar result by analogy.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“[N]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”).
211 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005).  
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share copyrighted music and video files.212  In fact, 90 percent of the files available for 
download were copyrighted,213 though it was not clear how often copyrighted versus 
uncopyrighted content was actually downloaded.214  Grokster apparently made no effort 
to filter copyrighted material from users’ downloads or disable access of those who used 
Grokster to download copyrighted materials.  215
¶66 The Supreme Court decided the case on a contributory liability theory and thus did 
not reach the issue of whether Grokster might be liable on a vicarious liability theory.216  
Recall that under a vicarious liability theory, profit and ability to control are the 
important considerations; whereas under a contributory theory, it is the intent to induce 
another to commit copyright infringement that controls the analysis.  The Court found 
Grokster liable under a contributory liability theory because it intentionally encouraged 
others to commit acts of infringement.217  Grokster had distributed an electronic 
newsletter “containing links to articles promoting its software’s ability to access popular 
copyrighted music”  and helped users locate and play copyrighted materials.    218 219
C.  The YouTube Business Model and Secondary Liability 
¶67 YouTube has avoided many of the mistakes of Grokster, Aimster, and others that 
led to the imposition of secondary liability.  Aimster’s user tutorial gave “as its only 
examples of file sharing the sharing of copyrighted music.”220  YouTube, in contrast, in a 
video tutorial providing instruction to users on how to upload videos, uses the example of 
a video entitled “No Donkey, No Fun,” which does not appear to be copyrighted.221  The 
video tutorial further warns that “[u]nless you recorded it or it belongs to you, it’s not 
allowed on the site.”222  In Grokster, the Court found evidence of illegal intent in the 
name “Grokster” because it was an “apparent derivative of Napster” and thus served to 
show that Grokster was attempting to attract former Napster users who were seeking a 
new venue to illegally download copyrighted works.223  In contrast, the name “YouTube” 
implies that the content is intended to be user-generated, not the copyrighted material of 
third parties.   It is widely recognized that, despite the availability of copyrighted 224
 
212 Id. at 920. 
213 Id. at 922. 
214 Id. at 923. 
215 Id. at 926. 
216 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931. 
217 Id. at 941 (“Here, [the] evidence . . . shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of 
copyright infringement.”).  
218 Id. at 938.  Similarly, in In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003), the court 
noted that Aimster had “invited [repeat infringers] to [engage in infringement], showed them how they 
could do so with ease using its system, and by teaching its users how to encrypt their unlawful distribution 
of copyrighted materials disabled itself from doing anything to prevent infringement.” 
219 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 938. 
220 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651 (emphasis in original). 
221 YouTube, Help Center: How Do I Upload a Video?, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=57924&topic=10525 (last visited Sept. 3, 
2007).   
222 Id.  See also Chmielewski, supra note 163, at C1 (“Unlike Internet file-swapping services such as 
Napster and Kazaa, YouTube doesn’t tout itself as a place to steal other people’s stuff.”).  
223 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 925. 
224 In the lexicon of trademark law, the name “YouTube” is suggestive (rather than descriptive, arbitrary, 
or fanciful), in that it suggests that “You” (i.e., users) can post videos on the “Tube” (a slang word for 
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material on its site, YouTube is a venue for sharing video generally, rather than for 
sharing copyrighted material in particular.225  Indeed, the company was apparently born 
of the frustration its founders experienced in trying to share video taken at a dinner party 
with friends, not out of a malevolent desire to exploit the copyrights of others.  226
¶68 YouTube easily meets the Sony rule that where a product is capable of substantial 
non-infringing uses, its provider may avoid contributory infringement liability.227  Unlike 
previous peer-to-peer companies that have been litigated out of existence, YouTube can 
point to a large and growing volume of actual (rather than merely theoretical) non-
infringing uses.  Individual users, of course, have posted a large volume of home-made 
videos on YouTube,228 and while the amount of user-created content on social 
networking sites is difficult to measure precisely, it is clearly substantial.   Major 229
 
television).  This meaning is corroborated by YouTube’s tag line: “Broadcast Yourself.”     
225 See Wu, supra note 75 (“Right or wrong, we seem to accept the benign vision of YouTube as an 
entity which, unlike Napster, was basically born as a place to showcase stupid human tricks.”). Does 
YouTube Make Google a Big Target For Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, October 11, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116049721244288215-
dh_XDre5B5O8j3fQQ2eaVvj6sxg_%2020061109.html (quoting Harvard law professor John Palfrey: “The 
core idea of YouTube is that a user creates a work on their own and then shares it online.”).     
226 Chris Gaither & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Google Bets Big on Videos, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at 
A1; but see John Cloud, The YouTube Gurus, TIME, Dec. 17, 2006, at 66, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570795,00.html (noting disagreement as to whether 
the dinner party story is an accurate account of YouTube’s origins).  
227 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429, 442 (C.D. Cal. 1979).  Although 
the Sony rule applied to providers of products, the reasoning applies analogously to providers of services.  
See generally Jiarui Liu, Why is Betamax an Anachronism in the Digital Age?  Erosion of the Sony 
Doctrine and Indirect Copyright Liability of Internet Technologies, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 343, 347-
48 (2005) (noting the conceptual difficulties with limiting the Sony rule to product manufacture or 
distribution to the exclusion of services).   
228 See Heather Green, Whose Video Is It, Anyway?, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Aug. 7, 2006, at 38, available 
at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_32/b3996051.htm (“A growing group of creative 
types is furiously producing clips, video blogs, and animated shorts with the hopes of making money 
through advertising or selling DVDs.”).   
229 A search of YouTube by the authors using the phrase “dance recital” revealed 2,820 videos, many of 
which appeared to be amateur videos of children’s dance recitals (frequently accompanied by music).  A 
search using the phrase “winter concert” turned up 3,040 videos, with titles such as “North Penn High 
School 2006 Winter Concert Hallelujah Chorus.” A search of “first birthday party” returned 1,740 videos.  
Time Magazine found that the word “grandmother” produced 1,800 hits.  John Cloud, The YouTube Gurus, 
TIME, Dec. 17, 2006, at 66,  available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570795,00.html.  Time magazine also discovered 
more than 780 videos resulting from a YouTube search of the term “police brutality.” James Poniewozik, 
The Beast with a Billion Eyes, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 63.  More generally, it has been noted that 
YouTube’s “top draws have been clips of pets reacting, babies laughing, and folks dancing and lampooning 
what major media heads think we should consider entertaining.” Rick Aristotle Munarriz, Good Luck 
Killing YouTube, Dec. 11, 2006, THE MOTLEY FOOL, http://www.fool.com/investing/high-
growth/2006/12/11/good-luck-killing-youtube.aspx; see also Gaither & Chmielewski, supra note 226, at 
A1 (noting YouTube’s “amateur videos that include light saber fights and karaoke sessions”). YouTube’s 
founder explains that “content includes home-made footage of all sorts, from stand-up routines to video 
diaries, delivery-room footage, amateur musical performances, and eyewitness footage from Hurricane 
Katrina and the Iraq War.” Tur v. YouTube, 2007 WL 1893635, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007).  A 
word of caution is in order, however.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurring opinion in Grokster, 
“[e]ven if the absolute number of noninfringing files copied . . . is large, it does not follow that the products 
are therefore put to substantial noninfringing uses . . . . The number of noninfringing copies may be . . . 
dwarfed by[] the huge total volume of files shared.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 947 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Thus, Viacom will surely attempt to demonstrate that 
although the number of non-infringing files on YouTube is substantial, liability for YouTube is still 
appropriate because this number is dwarfed by the number of infringing files.  Moreover, even if the 
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studios — from Twentieth Century Fox to Universal to Warner Brothers — are 
intentionally using YouTube to promote their content.230  Millions of songs, as well as 
other content, have been licensed for legitimate use on the YouTube site.    231
¶69 Moreover, there is a strong public policy argument that favors the continued 
development of YouTube and similar platforms.  YouTube’s facilitation of video content 
sharing constitutes a tremendous present public benefit,232 allowing those with minimal 
technological savvy to easily exchange works that may be educational,  newsworthy,233 234 
or simply have deep personal meaning.235  Given the ultimate aim of copyright “to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good,”236 copyright law must allow 
breathing room for technologies that dramatically increase the ease with which works can 
be accessed and exchanged.237  Nor are theorized potential benefits in short supply.  For 
example, it has been suggested that YouTube’s approach to video sharing may one day 
be incorporated into online dispute resolution platforms.238  Another commentator has 
noted that short sitcom pilots could be aired on YouTube prior to investing in a full-
length television series, allowing YouTube viewers to weigh in on whom to cast in 
 
fraction of non-infringing files is large, the fraction of non-infringing downloads may be smaller. 
230 See, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Borat Also Tricked Web, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 19, 2006, at 1 
(discussing the use of YouTube by Twentieth Century Fox to promote the film “Borat”); Holson, supra 
note 147 (noting Universal’s use of sites like YouTube to promote its films); Heather Green, YouTube: 
Waiting for the Payoff, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 18, 2006, at 56, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_38/b4001074.htm? (noting Warner Bros. promotion of 
a Paris Hilton CD via YouTube); Chmielewski, supra note 163, at C1 (“British satellite television service 
BSkyB’s ad agency posted a live-action re-enactment of the opening of ‘The Simpsons’ . . . to accompany 
the start of the new season. And the Chicago band OK Go posted a backyard video of itself doing a dance 
routine to the new single “A Million Ways,” spurring legions of fans to post their own renditions of the 
contagiously goofy performance.”); Noam Cohen, YouTube is Purging Copyrighted Clips, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2006, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/technology/30youtube.html 
(“Comedy Central stars in the past have used YouTube . . . to interact with their audience.”); see generally 
Gaither & Chmielewski, supra note 226, at A1 (quoting Boston venture capitalist Dennis Miller: “The most 
clever players in Hollywood’ are seeding YouTube with promotional video . . . .”). 
231 See Gaither & Chmielewski, supra note 226, at A1 (noting that YouTube has revenue sharing deals 
with CBS, Universal, and BMG); YouTube Signs Licensing Deal with British Composers’ Group, supra 
note 39. 
232 See Allen K. Yu, Enhancing Legal Aid Access Through An Open Source Commons Model, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 373, 382 (2007) (commending YouTube for conferring upon the public “two important goods: 
a video content library and a search index”); Michael Driscoll, Will YouTube Sail into the DMCA’s Safe 
Harbor or Sink for Internet Piracy, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 550, 566 (2007) (praising 
YouTube for “provid[ing] an alternate forum . . . [for] educating and influencing the public”).  
233 See, e.g.,  Lawrence Lessig, Google Book Search: the Argument, LESSIG.COM, Jan. 14, 2006,  
http://lessig.org/blog/2006/01/google_book_search_the_argumen.html (containing an embedded YouTube 
video addressing the copyright issues involved with the Google book search project).  
234 See, e.g., James Poniewozik, The Beast with a Billion Eyes, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006 at 63.  See Moises 
Naim, The YouTube Effect, FOREIGN POLICY, Jan. 1, 2007, at 104 (noting the effectiveness of YouTube in 
“expos[ing] human rights abuses,” and its potency as a tool for social change). 
235 For example, videos of weddings, births, soccer games, commencement speeches, and family 
reunions. 
236 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
237 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (“[The DMCA] will also make available via the Internet the 
movies, music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius.”).  “Our 
dependence on interconnected computers only grows as a means to communicate, manage our personal and 
business affairs and obtain the goods and services we want.” Id. at 65.
238 Saby Ghoshray, Charting the Future of Online Dispute Resolution: An Analysis of the Constitutional 
and Jurisdictional Quandary, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 317, 319 n.8 (2006). 
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leading television dramas, and breathing new life into moribund programs.239  More 
generally, allowing YouTube to continue could deliver tremendous long-term benefits as 
new uses of the technology emerge — with benefits that inure to consumers and 
copyright holders alike.  240
VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶70  Who would argue that society would be better off without the VCR or the 
photocopy machine?  A goal of copyright law is to promote the wide public availability 
of copyrighted works, and web sites such as YouTube clearly promote such wide public 
availability.  At the same time, the idea that a company valued at over $1 billion can 
continue its business model while copyright holders watch their copyrights being 
impetuously violated and scramble to submit unending take-down notices, may make 
some level-headed judges sit askance at the bench.  Yet this is the balance of interests 
that has been struck by Congress; and while no legislation can ever perfectly satisfy two 
masters, the safe harbors of the DMCA seem very nearly optimal.  So long as a company 
is diligent in taking down offending material, terminating repeat offenders, and 
accommodating standard technical measures, all the while conducting a business that is 
otherwise legitimate, it has done its part and should be allowed to concentrate its efforts 
on further innovation in the comforting knowledge that it is safe from copyright 
infringement liability.  Whether YouTube has effectively and timely accommodated 
standard technical measures and the extent to which it has induced direct infringement 
are ultimately factual determinations to be made in court.  Whatever the outcome of these 
factual issues, the result should not be another tombstone in the peer-to-peer graveyard.  
To shut down YouTube would be a grave error that would have adverse consequences 
across the social networking landscape, needlessly chopping with an axe what should be 
more delicately pruned with shears. 
¶71 As the contours of the safe harbor have not yet been brought into focus, social 
networking sites should constantly review with counsel the emerging cases addressing 
DMCA compliance, and scrupulously adhere to the DMCA’s strictures.  To guard against 
liability in the event that DMCA protection is found to be unavailable, companies should 
also consider their activities in the context of current copyright liability doctrines.  This 
may not be an easy task.  Exactly what the Grokster court meant by ruling that secondary 
copyright liability is based on the network “promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement”241 is 
not quite clear.  Online business models, corporate strategies, and advertisements should 
be carefully reviewed to negate any semblance of “promoting infringement.”  While 
service providers are busy remaining on the legitimate side of the copyright law, courts 
 
239 Chris Taylor, Google’s Copyright Fix, BUSINESS 2.0, Dec. 11, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/12/08/magazines/business2/youtube_piracy.biz2/. 
240 See generally R. Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young Technologies: A Comment on 
Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 877, 889-90 (2005) (“The 
example of the VCR suggests that tolerating some amount of infringement in the short term may be 
important in driving consumer adoption of a technology that, in the long term and with widespread 
deployment, will be put to much wider noninfringing uses that provide copyright owners with enormous 
markets.”). 
241 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005). 
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must be equally attentive to the incentives they are creating as they progressively define 
the nuanced requirements of the DMCA.  The significant value of online social 
networking demands that decisions be carefully structured to require responsible behavior 
on the part of service providers while assuring the continued existence of this cultural 
phenomenon. 
   35
